This arrangement produced by Erik
Anderson, 2006, in consultation with translations from several sources.
Because of well-known difficulties in the text, many passages are
liberally paraphrased and/or condensed. It is also enhanced with
additional notation, following these punctuation
conventions: |
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Headings, centered, are entirely supplemental and listed in the Index. Boldface synopsizes topics while incorporating source-text (though often paraphrased or rearranged). ( ) parentheses enclose source-text statements to facilitate ease of reading
[ ] bracketed text clarifies meaning <> supplements follow scholarly repairs to text deemed corrupt or missing {
} braces designate strictly informational notes; scholiast
commentaries are consigned to
endnotes |
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He first encountered philosophy, as he himself says, at
the age of fourteen. Apollodorus the Epicurean, in the first book of
his Life of Epicurus, reports that he turned to philosophy out of
disgust with his schoolmasters, because they could not explain to him the
meaning of chaos in Hesiod. |
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Hermippus, however, asserts that he began his career as a schoolmaster, and was then turned on to Philosophy by the works of Democritus. Hence, Timon says:
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At his exhortation, his three brothers, Neocles,
Chaeredemus, and Aristobulus, joined his sect, as Philodemus, the
Epicurean, reports in his tenth book On Philosophers. He had also a
slave, whose name was Mys, as Myronianus reports in his Historical
Parallels. |
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Diotimus the Stoic was very hostile to him; he slandered him egregiously, publishing fifty obscene letters, which he attributed to Epicurus. Yet another author ascribed letters to Epicurus that were commonly attributed to Chrysippus. Posidonius the Stoic, Nicolaus, and Sotion, in the twelfth book of his 24-volume Refutations of Diocles, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus also slandered him. They alleged that:
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Also, Theodorus says in the fourth book Against Epicurus, that:
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Epictetus calls him a preacher of unmanliness and showers abuse on him. Even Timocrates, the brother of Metrodorus, who was his disciple until he left the school, asserts in his book entitled Merriment, that:
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But all these people are devoid of sense. The
preponderance of witnesses speak of the insuperable kindness of our
philosopher to everyone, whether it be to his own country who honored him
with bronze statues, his friends who are so numerous that they could not
be counted in whole cities, or all his acquaintances who were bound to him
simply by the appeal of his doctrines. None deserted him, except
Metrodorus, the son of Stratoniceus, who went over to Carneades, probably
because he could not stand Epicurus’ unapproachable excellence. The
school itself, while every other school has declined, has continued in
perpetuity through an uninterrupted succession of head-philosophers. We
may also note his gratitude towards his parents, his generosity to his
brothers, and his kindness to his servants (as made plain by his will, and
also from the fact that they joined him in his philosophical pursuits, the
most eminent of them being the aforementioned Mys), and his universal
philanthropy towards all men. |
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His piety towards the gods and
his love for his country are beyond words. His deference to others
was so keen that he did not bother to enter public life. And
although he lived while very difficult times oppressed Greece, he still
remained in his own country, only venturing two or three times out to
Ionia to visit his friends, who used to throng to him from all quarters to
live with him in his garden, as we are told by Apollodorus (This garden he
bought for eighty minae). And Diocles, in his third Epitome,
says that they all lived in the most simple and economical manner; “They
were content,” he says, “with a small cup of light wine, or just drank
only water.” He also tells us that Epicurus forbade his companions from
holding property in common, unlike Pythagoras, who required it.
Such a practice, in his opinion, implied mistrust – and without
trust there is no friendship. And in his letters, he himself says
that he is content with water and plain bread, adding, “Send me some
Cytherean cheese, so that if I wish to have a feast, I may have the
means.” |
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Such was the real character of the man who laid down the doctrine that pleasure was the chief good. Athenaeus eulogizes him so: Oh men, you labor for small
things; And as we proceed, we shall understand this even better
from his doctrines and his maxims. |
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Among the earliest philosophers, Diocles reports that his
favorites were Anaxagoras (though he disagreed with him on some points)
and Archelaus, the teacher of Socrates. Diocles adds that he used to train
his pupils to commit his writings to memory. |
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Apollodorus, in his Chronology, asserts that he
was a pupil of Nausiphanes and Praxiphanes; but in his letter to
Euridicus, Epicurus himself denies this, saying that he was self-taught.
He and Hermarchus deny that Leucippus deserved to be called a philosopher;
though some authors, including Apollodorus the Epicurean, name him as the
teacher of Democritus. Demetrius the Magnesian, says that Epicurus was a
pupil of Xenocrates also. |
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He uses plain language in his works throughout, which is unusual, and Aristophanes, the grammarian, reproaches him for it. He was so intent on clarity that even in his treatise On Rhetoric, he didn’t bother demanding anything else but clarity. And in his correspondence he replaces the usual greeting, “I wish you joy,” by wishes for welfare and right living, “May you do well,” and “Live well.” Ariston says in his Life of Epicurus that he
derived his work entitled The Canon from the Tripod of
Nausiphanes, adding that Epicurus had been a pupil of his, as well of the
Platonist Pamphilus in Samos. Further, that he began to study philosophy
at twelve years of age, and that he founded his own school at
thirty-two. |
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Apollodorus’ Chronology further reports that:
He died, Hermarchus writes in his letters, from a kidney stone {or prostate cancer}, after being ill for a fortnight. Hermippus relates that he entered a bronze bath tempered with warm water, asked for a cup of undiluted wine, and drank it. He then bade his friends to remember his doctrines, and expired. Our epigram for him is expressed like so:
Such was his life, and such was his
death. |
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His last will was written as follows:
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I hereby bestow all my possessions to Amynomachus of
Bate, son of Philocrates, and to Timocrates of Potamos, son of Demetrius,
jointly and severally according to the gift-deed deposited at the
Metro-on, provided that they place my garden and all that pertains to it
in the care of Hermarchus of Mitylene, son of Agemarchus, and his
companions, and to whomsoever Hermarchus leaves as his philosophical
successors, so that they may live and study there, dedicated to the
practice of philosophy. And I call upon all those who adhere to my
teachings to help Amynomachus, Timocrates, and their heirs, to preserve
the garden community to the best of their ability, for all those to whom
my immediate successors hand it down. As for the house in Melite:
Amynomachus and Timocrates shall allow Hermarchus to live there the rest
of his life, together with all his companions in
philosophy. |
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Out of the revenues transferred by me to Amynomachus and Timocrates, I will that they, in consultation with Hermarchus, earmark provisions for:
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Amynomachus and Timocrates shall be the guardians of Epicurus, the son of Metrodorus, as well as the son of Polyaenus, as long as they live and study philosophy under Hermarchus. Likewise, they shall be the guardians of the daughter of Metrodorus, and when she is of marriageable age, they shall give her to whomsoever Hermarchus shall select from his companions in philosophy, provided she is well-behaved and obeys Hermarchus. Amynomachus and Timocrates shall also, out of my estate proceeds, give them sufficient support each year, after due consultation with Hermarchus. And they shall make Hermarchus co-trustee of the revenues, so that everything may be done with the approval of that man who has grown old with me in the study of philosophy, and who is now left as the head of the school. And when the girl comes of age, let Amynomachus and Timocrates pay her dowry, taking from my property a sum deemed by Hermarchus to be reasonable. They shall also provide for Nicanor, as I have done
hitherto, so that all those members of the school who have helped me in
private life and have shown me kindness in every way and have chosen to
grow old with me in philosophy should, so far as my means can go, never
lack the necessaries of life. |
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All my books are to be given to Hermarchus. And should anything happen to Hermarchus before the children of Metrodorus grow up, Amynomachus and Timocrates shall provide, as much as possible from the revenues bestowed by me, enough for their several needs, as long as they are well-behaved. And let them take care of the rest of my arrangements so that everything may be carried out, to the best of their ability. Of my slaves, I hereby emancipate Mys, Nicias, and Lycon: I also give Phaedrium her freedom. |
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Such were the
terms of his will. |
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He had a great number of disciples, the most famous being Metrodorus of Lampsacus, son of Athenaeus (or Timocrates) and Sande. From the time they first met, he never left him, except once when he went home for six months, but then returned to him. And he was a virtuous man in every respect, as Epicurus tells us in prefatory dedications in his works, and in the third book of his Timocrates. Being of such character, he gave his sister Bates in marriage to Idomeneus, while he himself took Leontium, the Attic courtesan, for his concubine. He bared all disturbances, and even death, without fear; Epicurus tells us so in his first book on Metrodorus. He reportedly died seven years before Epicurus himself, in the fifty-third year of his life. In the aforementioned will, Epicurus stipulates many provisions about the guardianship of his children – an indication that he had been dead some time. His brother was also a pupil of Epicurus, the aforementioned Timocrates – a trifling, silly man. Metrodorus wrote the following works:
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Similarly famous was Polyaenus of Lampsacus, son of Athenodorus, a just and kindly man, as Philodemus and his disciples affirm. Likewise was Epicurus’ successor, Hermarchus of Mitylene, son of Agemortus (a poor man) and originally a student of rhetoric. The following outstanding works by him are still extant: Against Empedocles, in twenty-two
books He died of paralysis, after fulfilling an excellent
career. |
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There were also Leonteus of Lampsacus and his wife Themista, to whom Epicurus wrote letters, and Colotes and Idomeneus, also of Lampsacus. Hermarchus was succeeded in turn as head of the school by:
There were three other men who bore the name of Epicurus:
one, the son of Leonteus and Themista; the second: a native of Magnesia;
the third: a military chief. |
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Epicurus was a most prolific author, exceeding all before
him in number of books published: more than three hundred volumes of
them. In all these works, there is not one citation of other
sources; they are entirely filled with Epicurus’ own
words. Chrysippus tried to match his vast literary output, but
Carneades denounced him as a literary parasite: “Indeed, if Epicurus had
written something, Chrysippus would vie to write just as much. To
accomplish this, he wrote down whatever popped into his head and often
repeated himself. In his haste, he neglected to do any editing, and
he used many lengthy citations to the point of filling his entire books
with them, not unlike Zeno and Aristotle.” |
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Among the writings of Epicurus, the following are his best:
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I will attempt to present the views expressed in these writings by reproducing three of his letters, in which he himself has given a summary of his entire philosophy. I will also reproduce his Principal Doctrines and some other sayings worth citing, so that you may be thoroughly acquainted with the man, and know how to judge him. The first letter, written to Herodotus, deals with physics; the second, to Pythocles, deals with heavenly phenomena; the third, to Menoeceus, contains teachings concerning human life. His Three Divisions
of Philosophy: Canonics, Physics, and Ethics |
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But first: some few preliminary remarks about his division of his philosophy. It is divided into three subjects: Canonics, Physics, and Ethics. Canonics forms the introduction to the system and is found in a single work entitled The Canon. Physics consists of a comprehensive theory of nature; it is found in the thirty-seven books On Nature and is also summarized among his Letters. Ethics, finally, deals with choice and avoidance, which may be found in the books On Lifecourses, among his Letters, and in the book On the End-Goal. Canonics and Physics are usually treated jointly. The former defines the criterion of truth and discusses first principles (the elementary part of philosophy), while the latter deals with the creation and destruction of things in nature. Ethics counsels upon things chosen versus those avoided, the art of living, and the end-goal. Dialectics they dismiss as superfluous – they say that ordinary terms for things is sufficient for physicists to advance their understanding of nature. |
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Now in The Canon Epicurus states that the criteria of truth are:
Epicureans in general also include: mental images focused by thought. His own statements are also to be found in the Letter to Herodotus and the Principle Doctrines. “Sensation,” he says, “is non-rational and
unbiased by memory, for it is neither produced spontaneously {inside the
mind} nor can it add or subtract information from its external cause.
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“Nothing exists which can refute sensations. Similar sensations cannot refute each other {e.g., things seen}, because they are equally valid. Dissimilar sensations cannot either {e.g., things seen versus things heard}, since they do not discriminate the same things. Thus, one sensation cannot refute another, since they all command our attention. Nor can reason refute sensations, since all reason depends on them. The reality of independent sensations confirms the truth of sensory information (seeing and hearing are real, just as experiencing pain is). “It follows that we can draw inferences about things hidden from our senses only from things apparent to our senses. Such knowledge results from applying sensory information to methods of confrontation, analogy, similarity, and combination, with some contribution from reasoning also. “The visions produced by
insanity and dreams also stem from real objects, for they do act upon us;
and that which has no reality can produce no action.” |
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Preconception, the
Epicureans say, is a kind of perception, correct opinion, conception, or
general recollection of a frequently experienced external object.
For example: ‘Such-and-such kind of thing is a man’ – as soon as the word
‘man’ is uttered, the figure of a man immediately comes to mind as a
preconception, already formed by prior sensations. |
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Thus, the first notion a word awakens in us is a correct
one; in fact, we could not inquire about anything if we had no previous
notion of it. For example: ‘Is that a horse or an ox standing over
there?’ One must have already preconceived the forms of a horse and
an ox in order to ask this. We could not even give names to things
if we had no preliminary notion of what the things were. It follows
that preconceptions clearly exist. |
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Opinions also depend on preconceptions. They serve
as our point of reference when we ask, for example, ‘How do we know if
this is a man?’ The Epicureans also use the word assumption
for opinion. An opinion may be true or
false. True opinions are confirmed and uncontradicted
{by the testimony of sensations}; false opinions are unconfirmed and
contradicted {by the testimony of sensations}. Hence they speak of
awaiting {testimony} when one awaits a closer view of an object
before proclaiming it to be, for example, a tower. |
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Feelings they say are two: pleasure and pain, which affect every living being. Pleasure is congenial to our nature, while pain is hostile to it. Thus they serve as criteria for all choice of avoidance. They also say that there are two kinds of philosophical inquiry: one concerns facts, the other mere words. This, then, covers the basic points regarding philosophical division and each criterion. Now we shall turn to his letter {which discusses the basic principles of physics}: Letter to
Herodotus Epicurus to Herodotus, Greetings, |
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For those, Herodotus, who can neither master all my
physical doctrines nor digest my lengthier books On Nature, I have
written a summary of the whole subject in enough detail to enable them to
easily remember the most basic points, and thereby grasp these important
and irrefutable principles entirely on their own, to whatever degree they
take up the study of physics. Even those who have thoroughly learned
the entire system must be able to summarize it, for an overall
understanding is more often needed than a specific knowledge of
details. |
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We must therefore continually refresh our memory with
these principles, in order to retain the general outline. Moreover,
once the basic points have been mastered, specific knowledge of details
can be learned more easily. But the most important benefit of
specific knowledge, even for the fully-initiated, is that it reinforces a
general understanding of the fundamental principles. Indeed, it is
impossible to reap the rewards of further studying the universe, unless
one can comprehend in simple terms all that could be expressed in great
detail. |
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Since this pattern of study is useful to everyone concerned, I, who devote myself continuously to the subject and who am most at peace by living this sort of life, have prepared for you a summary and outline of my entire teachings. |
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First, Herodotus, we must use clearly defined terms, so that when we refer to them, we can make judgments upon particular inquiries, problems, or opinions, rather than to remain undecided after endless arguments devoid of meaning. Thus, we must accept, without further proof, the first mental image each word conjures up, if we are to have any standard to refer a particular inquiry, problem, or opinion. Next, we must conduct all our investigations based on the testimony of our senses, feelings, and all other valid criteria. In this way, we shall have some sign by which to make inferences about things awaiting confirmation <by the testimony of our senses> and also about things <that will always remain> hidden from our senses. |
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Having made this distinction, let us now consider what is not directly evident to our senses: Nothing comes into
existence from non-existence. For if that were possible,
anything could be created out of anything, without requiring seeds.
And if things which disappear became non-existent, everything in the
universe would have surely vanished by now. But the universe has
always been as it is now, and always will be, since there is nothing it
can change into. Nor is there anything outside the universe which
could infiltrate it and produce change. |
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The universe is made up
of bodies and void. That bodies exist is obvious to anyone’s
senses. We may also make inferences about
things hidden from our senses, as I have noted above, only from signs that
our senses can detect, and this is how we infer the void. For
if the void, which we also call place, room, and
intangible substance, did not exist, bodies would have no place to
be or anywhere to move through – but they
are clearly seen to be moving. Beyond these constituents [body and
void] nothing else is conceivable by any means. Both are regarded as
whole substances – not
attributes of them. |
{1} | ||||||||||
Compounds are
collections of many elements; the primary bodies are the elements
themselves. The latter must be uncuttable {atomic}, and
permanent – otherwise all things would crumble into
non-existence. Some elements must be strong enough to survive
the dissolution of compounds; these are fully solid by nature, incapable
of dissolution to any degree. So these primary bodies must be
uncuttable bodies. |
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The universe is
infinite. For that which is finite has an outmost edge, and an
outmost edge can only be found in comparison to something beyond it
<but the universe cannot be so compared>, hence, since it has no
outmost edge, it has no limit; and since it has no limit, it must be
unlimited and infinite. Indeed, the universe is infinite in two
aspects: by the number of bodies it contains and by the extent of the
void. For if the void were infinite but the bodies finite, the
bodies would go careening through the infinite void and never stay put,
owing to the lack of other bodies to hinder and coral them by colliding
with them. And if the void were finite, there would be no room for
infinite bodies. |
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The atoms have a unimaginable variety of shapes.
Since all compounds are formed by (and dissolve into) solid
atomic bodies, the many varieties of compounds that exist can only arise
from an unimaginable number of atomic shapes. But while the number
of atoms of each shape is utterly infinite, the number of
shapes is not utterly infinite, just unimaginably many,
<otherwise atoms would have an infinite range of sizes, which would
defy observation>. |
{3} | ||||||||||
The atoms are in constant motion throughout eternity.
{some text missing} Some get separated by great
distances from each other. Others oscillate in one place whenever
they happen to get entangled into a compound, or surrounded by a
compound. It is the nature of both bodies and void which allows this
oscillatory motion. For the bodies, being solid, rebound on
collision to whatever distance their entanglement allows them, while the
void offers no resistance in the intervening space. This may
continue until at last the repeated shocks bring on the dissolution of the
compound. There is no beginning to all these motions; the atoms and void
are eternal. |
{4}
{5} | ||||||||||
These above points, if remembered, should suffice as an
outline for developing an understanding of the basic aspects of
existence. |
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{Misplaced text 45b moved to 73 below} |
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Images abound which
resemble the outlines of shapes. These husk-like emanations [of
atoms] are the thinnest things perceivable. Their existence is
possible because in the space around us, appropriate conditions exist to
accommodate their hollowness and thinness, thus preserving the same
orientation and shape as the surfaces they are thrown off from.
These outlines we call ‘images.’ {Misplaced text 46b &
47a moved to 61 below} That the images are exquisitely
thin is uncontested by anything evident, for they move with insuperable
speed and arrive at our eyes together. We thus know that their
passage is met with little or no resistance, whereas many, indeed all,
compounds suffer immediate collisions. |
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The creation of images
happens as fast as thought. They are cast off continuously, in
outline form, from the surfaces of compounds – obviously
without wasting away, thanks to reciprocal replenishment. The
orientation and arrangement of atoms in an image usually correspond to the
emitting surface without distortion. But sometimes images get
combined in midair. This fusion happens quickly since no
interactions are required within the volume of space contained by their
outlines. There are also other ways in which images are
produced. None of these facts are contested by our sensations, when
we consider how sensation brings us coherent visions of objects around
us. |
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Sight and perception are due to images received directly from the surfaces of objects. We would not perceive their shape or color very effectively if their emanations were actively mediated by the intervening air {as Democritus believed}, or by means of light-rays or some sort of flowing current directed to us by them. Rather, we are directly impacted by husks from the objects, which share the color and shape of their source, but are thin enough to penetrate our senses. Since these are cast off in rapid succession (in sympathy with the vibrations of atoms in the depths of the object), they present an uninterrupted image and preserve their relationship to the source. |
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The mental picture formed by intense visual scrutiny or concentrated thought, is true. Because this sort of picture is created by the continuous impact of imagery, or by the actual residue it leaves behind, the shapes or properties of an external object are thereby correctly revealed. Falsehood and error reside in opinion. When <an image awaiting> confirmation (or at least non-contradiction) from further sensory evidence fails to be so confirmed <or is contradicted>, this is due to the embellishment of the image by opinion. {text uncertain here, perhaps also some missing} ... For the mental pictures that come to us either in sleep,
or by concentration, or by the other instruments of judgment, would not
have such similarity to those things we deem to truly exist if there were
not some kind of flow of material actually coming to us from the
objects. And error would not exist if we did not also permit within
ourselves some other activity similar <to the purposeful apprehension
of mental images>, yet different. It is through this other
activity {i.e., forming opinions} that, when unattested or contested,
produces falsehood, and if attested or uncontested,
truth. |
{6} | |||||||||
This principle too, then, is important to maintain. Otherwise, the criteria based on self-evident impressions would be destroyed and falsehood would be taken as well-established as truth, throwing everything into confusion. |
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Hearing results from a sort of current. It may come from a person who speaks, or an object that rings, bangs, or produces any sort of auditory sensation. This current is dispersed into particles, all alike, preserving their common relationship with a well-defined continuity extending all the way back to their origin. When hearing occurs, the source is usually recognized; failing that, it at least reveals that something is out there. Without this common relationship stemming from the source, there would not be such awareness. We should not believe that the air itself is shaped by the spoken word or sound, for the nature of air is hardly shapeable. Rather, the effort of speaking squeezes out certain particles in a breath-like stream that produces auditory sensations in the person we are speaking to. |
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The sense of smell, like hearing, also depends on a current. Here again, certain particles flow away from an object that are suitably-sized to pass into this senses. Some kinds of smells are disharmonious and unwelcome, others harmonious and welcome. |
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Atoms only have shape, weight, size, and attributes of shape
{e.g., smoothness or roughness}. While qualities of compounds
change, the atoms do not change at all, since something solid and
indestructible must persist in order to make change possible. Change
results from rearrangements of certain particles – or
from their addition and removal (but never to or from non-existence).
Hence these particles are interchangeable, but unchangeable – their
own particular weights and shapes persist. |
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Even when objects we ordinarily see are chipped away at,
they still retain shape, weight, {and size} – while
other qualities do not remain but vanish entirely. The properties
which endure suffice for the variety of compounds in nature; it
is necessary that at least these properties remain and not be
annihilated. |
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Atoms differ in size, but are not of every size. We must not think otherwise, lest the visible world prove us wrong. The evidence of our differing feelings and sensations is best explained if atoms differ in size, but they need not be of every size in order to account for qualitative differences that we perceive. If atoms were of every size, some would have to be large enough to see. Clearly this isn’t so, and it’s impossible to suppose how an atom might become visible. |
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No finite body has infinite parts, and all parts must
have a lower limit to size. We must reject the idea that
something finite can be cut smaller and smaller forever – for then all
physical objects would be brittle and we could, in concept, exhaust any
compound {by infinite cuts} and thereby completely annihilate
it. But we also cannot suppose there are infinite parts
in a finite thing, for this raises an immediate problem: how can something
containing infinite parts itself be finite? Each part must extend to
some size, and however small they may be, an infinity of them would
have to extend to infinite size. But a finite body has a visible
extremity – even if we
can't isolate it. We may suppose the outermost part has a
similarly-sized neighboring part, and likewise in sequence, but not
without end. |
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Consider the smallest width we can
possibly see: it’s both like and unlike a span. While it seems
to have properties in common with an extended object, it has no
distinguishable parts. If we attempt to distinguish parts – one on
this side, the other on that – neither of them can be visibly smaller than
the whole minimum. All we can do is inspect the minima in sequence
and we neither find them all in the same place, nor can we find the places
where they touch each other. Yet, in their own peculiar way, they
build size – the larger the size, the more minima there are; the smaller
the size, the fewer. |
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The same description applies to the smallest atomic size. Obviously, the smallest part of an atom is much smaller than the smallest width we can see. But here again we can follow the same analogy as we did with our claim that the atom has size: we draw the analogy from the scale of seeable things. Hence, the atomic minima must be regarded as fixed units, which may serve, at least in our imagination, as a means of reckoning atomic size. But this is as far as the analogy can go. We should not take it so far as to think that atoms can be constructed or changed by arranging or rearranging atomic minima, because it is impossible for atomic minima to be moved individually. |
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There is no top
and bottom in infinite space, but up and down are
still meaningful. For wherever we stand it is possible to
project a line above our heads, or below our feet, stretching to
infinity. It is possible to do both without confusing each direction
with the other. Therefore it is also possible to regard one type of
motion as upward to infinity, and another type as downwards
to infinity. Even if that which moves from where we are to the
places above our heads arrives countless times at the feet of those above,
or in the other case, at the heads of those below, the two motions are
still opposite. |
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Atoms move equally fast
through the void when nothing collides with them. Large and
heavy ones move no faster than small and light ones, nor vice a versa, as
long as nothing obstructs them. Their movements are neither made
quicker when deflected upwards or sideways, nor when they fall downwards
due to their respective weights. The atom will traverse any kind of
trajectory with the speed of thought as long as the motion caused in
either of these ways maintains itself – that is, until the atom is either
re-deflected by another collision, or its own weight counteracts the force
of a previous collision. |
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Motion through the void may traverse any ordinary
distance in an extraordinarily short time, because the lack of obstruction
from colliding bodies. Only through collision and non-collision can
atomic motion resemble “slow” and “fast.” |
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On the other hand, a moving body cannot arrive at several
places at once in the shortest conceivable period of time. That is
unthinkable. But when in a perceivable period of time a body
arrives along with others from some point or other in the infinite, the
distance covered will be extraordinary. If it were otherwise,
collisions would have been involved – though we still allow some limit to
speed of motion as a result of non-collision. This too is a useful
principle to grasp. |
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Atoms also move equally fast in compounds, despite anything said to the contrary. Compounds, and the atoms within them, do move in a single direction in the shortest perceivable period of time. But in the shortest conceivable period of time, the atoms are going every direction, owing to their frequent collisions. Only the continuity of their collective motion is slow enough to be seen. The opinion (added to what the senses cannot perceive) that “there will be continuity of motion in conceivable periods of time” is not true in the case of atoms. Only what is grasped by the careful use of the senses or by the mental apprehension of concepts is wholly true. |
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The soul is a
fine-structured material distributed throughout the body. Our
sensations and feelings provide the strongest confirmation for this.
It resembles a wind in some respects and heat in others. But
its fine structure makes it greatly different from both – and this is what
unites its feelings with the entire body. All this is demonstrated
by the soul’s powers: its feelings, its rapid action, its thought
processes, and all of its faculties which we are deprived of upon
death. |
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The soul is primarily
responsible for sensation. Yet, it would not have acquired
sensation if it were not contained in some way by the rest of the
body. The rest of the body, having furnished the proper setting for
experiencing sensation, is also given some capacity for sensation
from the soul – though not all the capacity of the soul. That
is why the rest of the body does not have sensation when the soul has been
separated from it. For the body never had such capacity in and by
itself; it made sensation possible for something else [the soul], which
came into existence along with it. The soul, thanks to the
mechanisms of the body, at once produces its own power to experience
sensation while returning a share of this power to the body, as I have
said, because of their close contact and united feelings. |
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|
Sensation is never lost when the soul remains, even if other parts of the body are lost. Indeed, even if part of the soul is lost along with the part of the body that enclosed it, then as long as part of the soul remains, it will still experience sensation. But sensation is lost when the body remains and the soul has been lost – no matter how small the atoms comprising the soul may be. When the whole body is destroyed, it no longer
possesses sensation, because the soul is dissolved and no longer has
the same powers and motions. For whenever the body holding the soul
is no longer able to confine and contain it, we cannot think of the soul
as still experiencing sensation, since it would no longer have the use of
the appropriate mechanisms. |
{7} | |||||||||
Those who say that the soul is incorporeal are talking
nonsense. The usage of the word ‘incorporeal’ can only be
applied to what is incorporeal in essence: the void. But the
void can neither act nor be acted upon; it merely allows bodies to move
through itself. For if that were so, it would be unable to act or be
acted upon in any way – yet, we clearly see the soul is capable of
both. |
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If, as was said at the beginning, you explore your feelings and sensations while considering these points about the soul, you will find enough of a basis in this outline to enable you to discover the details with certainty. |
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Shapes, colors, sizes, weights, etc., are
properties pertaining to bodies. This is true for bodies
in general as well for perceivable ones, where properties are recognized
by direct sensation. Properties are not substances themselves – it
is inconceivable to think of them separate from the things they are
properties of. Nor are they non-existent, nor are they incorporeal
things attached to the body, nor are they parts of a
body. |
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A body as a whole gets its enduring characteristics
from the combination of all its properties. This does not mean
that these properties come together and form the body in the way that a
larger body is formed by smaller parts (e.g., by primary bodies or
compounds smaller than the whole). We merely mean, as I have said,
that the whole body gets its enduring characteristics from the presence of
the properties within. These properties have their own way of being
perceived and distinguished (together with the body – never separate from
it); it is because of this all-inclusive notion of the body as a whole
that it is so recognized. |
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Now it often also happens that temporary qualities
accompany body – accidents. They too do not exist by
themselves nor are they incorporeal. Accidents are neither like the
whole, which we grasp collectively as a body, nor are they like the
enduring characteristics essential to a body. Any accident can be
recognized by the appropriate senses, along with the compound to which it
belongs; but we see a particular accident only when it is present with the
body, since accidents are temporary. |
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We must not deny the self-evident reality of accidents,
just because they do not have the nature of the whole (i.e., the
body, of which it becomes an attribute) nor the nature of permanent
attributes. Nor should we think of them as entities having
independent existence. We should think of accidents of bodies
as just what they seem to be and not as permanent attributes nor as
existing independently. They are seen in just the way that our
senses discern them. |
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Time is something else that must also be
carefully considered. We cannot investigate time in the
same way we can for things that can be seen in objects and visually
apprehended by the mind. Instead, we must reason by analogy from the
experience of what we call “a long time” versus “a short
time.” |
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We do not need better descriptions of time; we may use those already at hand. Nor do we need to assert that this unique entity is based on something else of the same nature, as some indeed do. It is only important to consider the things we associate with time and the ways in which we measure it. This requires no elaborate demonstration – only a review of the facts. We associate time with days and nights (and fractions thereof), and likewise with the presence and absence of feelings, and with motions and rests. Thus we recognize that the very thing we call time is, in a special sense, an accident of accidents. |
{8} | ||||||||||
The number of world-systems is
infinite. These include worlds similar to our own {which
means the Earth plus the sky and all its celestial bodies}
and dissimilar ones. For the atoms, being infinitely many, as
already proved, travel any distance, and those which are able to form a
world are not exhausted by the formation of one world or by any finite
number of them – both ones like ours or other kinds. So nothing
prevents there being an infinite number of worlds. |
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{World-systems, like all compounds, are perpetually
created and destroyed}. The world-systems, and every observable
compound, come into being from the infinite. All such things, large
or small, have been separated off from it as a result of individual
entanglements. And all will disintegrate back into it – some faster,
some slower, and by differing causes. |
{9} | ||||||||||
{text missing} Though the creation of worlds is
inevitable, we must not suppose that each necessarily has a single shape
<or every possible shape...> |
{10} | ||||||||||
{text missing} <... Moreover, with regard to living things,> it cannot be proven that the seeds from which animals, plants, and other things originate are not possible on any particular world-system. |
{11} | ||||||||||
In their environment, primitive men were taught or
inspired by instinct to do many kinds of things, but reason later built
upon what had been begun by instinct. New discoveries were made
– faster among some people, slower among others. In some ages and
eras <progress occurred by great leaps>, in others by small
steps. |
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Words, for instance, were not initially coined by design. Men naturally experienced feelings and impressions which varied in the particulars from tribe to tribe, so that each of the individual feelings and impressions caused them to vocalize something in a particular way, in accordance also with differing racial and environmental factors. Later, particular coinages were made by consensus within the individual races, so as to make the distinctions less ambiguous and more concise. Men who shared knowledge also introduced certain abstractions, and brought words for them into usage – sometimes making utterances spontaneously, and other times choosing words rationally. This is mainly how they achieved self-expression. |
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Celestial phenomena do not occur because there is some
divinity in charge of them. No deity could arrange and maintain
motions, periods, eclipses, risings, settings, and the like, while at the
same time enjoy perfect happiness and immortality. For trouble,
anxiety, anger, and obligation are not associated with blessedness, but
rather with weakness, fear, and dependence on others. Masses
of fire [are not gods]; they have not acquired a state of
divine blessedness nor have they undertaken these motions of their own
free will. Whenever we speak of blessedness, we must respect [the
true meaning of] its majesty, or else we shall create great turmoil in our
souls. So it stands to reason that when celestial bodies were formed
(at the time our world-system was created) the regularity of their motions
was fixed. |
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We must accept the following beliefs:
|
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Detailed celestial data do not contribute to the
happiness which comes with general knowledge. Those who have
studied settings and risings, periods and eclipses, and the like, but are
ignorant of their underlying nature and their causes are subject to the
same fears despite what they know – or perhaps even greater fears, because
the amazement that follows from studying these phenomena does not reveal
their fundamental causes. |
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If we find several possible causes for some celestial
phenomena, we have not failed to learn enough to secure peace of mind and
happiness. In order to investigate the causes of celestial
phenomena (or anything else which cannot be scrutinized up-close) we begin
by finding how many ways similar phenomena are produced within the range
of our senses. We must pay no attention to those who fail to
recognize any difference between what results from a single cause or from
several causes; they forget that these phenomena are only perceived at a
distance, and they do not know what circumstances make it possible or
impossible to achieve peace of mind. If we recognize that phenomena
may occur in several ways, we shall be no less disturbed than if we knew
for sure that a particular phenomenon happens in some particular
way. |
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Additionally, the worst turmoil in human souls arise
because:
|
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Peace of mind comes from having been freed from all this, and by always remembering the essential principles of our whole system of belief. Thus, we should pay attention to those feelings and sensations which are present within us (both those we have in common with humankind at large, and the particular ones we have in each of ourselves) according to each of the criteria of truth. Only then shall we pin down the sources of disturbance and fear. And when we have learned the causes of celestial phenomena and related events, we shall be free from whatever is terrifying to the rest of humankind. |
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Here then, Herodotus, you have the most important points of physics set down in an outline form that is suitable for memorization. I believe that anyone who masters this much will be made stronger than his fellow men, even without going into a more detailed study. And one will also be better disposed to understanding many detailed points of our system as a whole [should he elect to do so]; these general principles will be of constant help if he keeps them in mind. For no matter how far along one is in mastering the details, those who solve their solve their problems with reference to this outline will make the greatest advances in the knowledge of the whole. And even those who have made less progress can, without oral instruction, quickly review the matters of most importance for peace of mind. This concludes his letter on Physics. Now lets look
at his letter on heavenly phenomena |
|||||||||||
Letter to
Pythocles |
|||||||||||
Epicurus to Pythocles, Greetings, |
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Cleon brought me your letter, in which you show kindness towards me worthy of my affection for you, and you tried, not unconvincingly, to recall the lines of reasoning that lead to a happy life. You ask me to send you a brief account of phenomena of the sky, concise enough to be easily remembered, because what is written in my other books, as you say, is difficult to remember even with continual study. I am pleased to yield to your desire, and I have good hope that it shall also be useful to many others, especially to those who have only recently become acquainted with the true teachings about the natural world and to those who are too busy in their daily lives to devote much time to more advanced study. So carefully grasp these principles, memorize them thoroughly, and meditate on them along with what I sent in the Small Summary addressed to Herodotus. |
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We begin by recognizing that knowledge of the phenomena of the sky, whether discussed along with other doctrines or separately, has no other purpose than for peace of mind and fearlessness, just as it is in all our other pursuits. |
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It is unwise to desire what is
impossible: to proclaim a uniform theory about everything. So
here we cannot adopt the method that we have followed in our discussions
of ethics, or our solutions to problems of physics (e.g., that the
universe consists of bodies and void, that atoms are elementary to all
things, and so on). For those we gave a single precise explanation
for every fact, consistence with the evidence of the
sense. |
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The phenomena of the sky, however, present a different
situation. Each of these phenomena allow several differing
explanations for its creation and its nature, all of which may agree with
visible evidence. Rather than committing to explanations based on
unwarranted assumptions and dogma, we may only theorize as far as the
phenomena allow. For our life has no need of unreasonable and
groundless opinions; our one need is untroubled existence. So if one
is satisfied, as he should be, with that which is shown to be less than
certain, it is no cause for concern that things can be explained in more
than one way, consistent with the evidence. But if one accepts one
explanation and rejects another that is equally consistent with the
evidence, he is obviously rejecting science altogether and taking refuge
in myth. |
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Things we know and understand to happen on earth are sometimes analogous with phenomena of the sky. But since the latter may be due to a variety of causes, our observations of each may be reckoned with a variety of earthly analogies. |
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A world-system is a finite part of the universe, encompassing celestial bodies, the earth, and all their phenomena. It is separated from the infinite <by a finite boundary which, when it perishes, all within it will be thrown into chaos. This boundary is:
All are possibilities, since no
contradictory evidence can be seen; we cannot even see the boundary of our
own world. |
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|
World-systems, which are knowably infinite, come into being either in the spaces between or within other world-systems. They form in places that are mostly empty (but not absolutely empty, as some think) when the appropriate seeds (from one or several worlds or anywhere in between) pile up. This occasions further accumulation (and possibly relocation) until the new world is complete and durable, and it will last as long as the foundation underlying it continues receiving new material. It’s not good enough to say, as one of the so-called physicists {Democritus?} has said, that there merely needs to be a reunion of elements, or some colossal whirl in the void compelled by necessity, and that the world keeps growing in size until it bumps into another world – for this goes against the evidence. |
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The sun, moon, and other celestial bodies were created
along with the rest of the world-system. They were not formed
beforehand and later drawn by into our world. Rather, they
immediately began to take shape and grow, as did the earth and sea, by
means of a whirling accumulation of fine parts of some type (either airy
or fiery or both). This is what the evidence
suggests. |
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The sun, moon, and other celestial bodies are about
large as they appear to be. They may actually be a little
larger, a little smaller, or exactly the same size as at what we see, just
as signal-fires on earth, when seen from distance, appear to vary.
Any objection to this point will be easily overthrown, if one pays
attention to the clear evidence, as I demonstrate in my books On
Nature. |
{12} {13} | ||||||||||
The risings and settings of the sun, moon, and other
celestial bodies may be due to:
All of these possibilities
conform to the visible evidence. |
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The paths of the sun and moon vary with the seasons
because:
Again, all these scenarios do
not contradict what we see, so we should go along with any of them,
disregarding the unquestioning techniques of astronomers. |
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The alternating phases of the moon are due to:
Yet again, we must not be so
enamored with a unique explanation that we reject others without reason,
failing to understand the limits of human observation in our impossible
desire for certainty. |
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|
With regard to moonlight, either:
After all, many things in our
experience are observed to have their own light from themselves, many from
outside sources. |
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There is nothing about celestial phenomena which prevents
us from accepting any theory as possible if we always keep the principle
of plurality in mind as we examine the explanations and causes that are
consistent with the evidence. We should resist the explanations that
are inconsistent with the evidence, and not give them credibility without
basis. Nor should we fall back, in any way or on any occasion, upon
the method of unique explanations. |
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|
The appearance of a face on the moon may be the
result of:
Again, we do not abandon this
method while investigating celestial phenomena; for if anyone contradicts
clearly observed facts, he will never be able to have true peace of
mind. |
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Eclipses of the sun and the moon occur because:
Sometimes we must consider
compatible causes together, realizing that it is not impossible for two
causes to be in effect simultaneously. |
{14} | ||||||||||
The regularity of celestial motions must be accounted
for like events on earth: without introducing the need of the
gods. The divine must be kept free from duties and in perfect
happiness, otherwise all our explanations of celestial phenomena will be
in vain –
just as it is for those who ignore the method of the possible and
vainly stick to the belief that each phenomenon can only happen in one
way. By rejecting other possible causes, they are driven to
unreasonable explanations, and are unable to take into account the
observations which signify other things. |
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The changing lengths of day and night may be due
to:
Such things are observed to happen in our earthly experience, so we must speak in a manner consistent with them when we speak of phenomena of the sky. But those who insist on a single cause oppose the evidence of the senses and have strayed far from the way in which one may learn. |
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|
Signs that predict the weather may be due to:
Both are in harmony with
phenomena, but we cannot tell under what conditions a sign is due to one
cause or another. |
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Clouds come into being and take shape when:
It is not impossible that cloud formation is
also produced in several other ways. |
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Rain can be produced from clouds if:
A more severe rain occurs when there is an
accumulation of what is needed to cause such a downpour. |
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Thunder could be caused by:
The evidence of our senses
requires that thunder, just like other things, may be produced in many
ways. |
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|
Lightning may also have several causes; it could
happen when:
It is easy to see other ways in
which lightning may happen if we stick to the evidence of the senses and
are able to compare it with similar earthly phenomena. |
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|
Lightning precedes thunder in a cloud formation
because:
|
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|
Lighting-bolts may be created when:
Many other explanations are
possible. Just avoid the mythical ones, which you will do as long as
you follow the evidence of the senses to get indications about what is
unseen. |
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|
Cyclones may be formed by:
However they are produced, when cyclones touch down over land, a tornado results; over the sea, they cause a waterspout. |
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|
Earthquakes happen when:
And there could be many other possible causes
for these shakings of the earth. |
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{There is a lacuna here} |
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....occasional winds, when some foreign substance continually and gradually makes its way in, and when water collects in large amounts. The remaining winds arise when a few fall into the many hollows and get spread out. |
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|
Hail is formed by:
Hail may have spherical shapes because:
|
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|
Snow may be produced when:
In other ways too, snow may be
produced. |
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|
Dew is produced when:
When dewdrops are transformed
by freezing, <frost results.> |
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Ice results from:
|
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|
A rainbow may be the result of:
Perhaps light and air form a peculiar combination that produces the colors of the rainbow, either all together or separately, and when the light shining on the different parts is reflected, the surrounding air assumes such color as we see according to the light that shines on the several parts. The rainbow is round in shape because:
|
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|
A halo around the moon is formed when:
|
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Comets appear when at certain times:
|
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Circumpolar stars “revolve in their place” {cf., Homer, Iliad 18.487} because:
And you will find many other ways in which
this can be accomplished if you can consider what agrees with the evidence
of the senses. |
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Wandering stars (if they do indeed wander while the
rest do not) are due to:
But to assign a single cause to
these things, when the visible evidence demands a number of them, is
madness. It is done foolishly by those who are fanatically devoted
to the vain notions of astrology, and who assign meaningless causes to
things, even to the point of burdening divine nature. |
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These wandering stars are observed to lag behind
others because:
But to give a single
explanation for these things is the act of one who wishes to put on a show
for crowds. |
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|
Shooting stars may due in part to:
And there are another explanations of these phenomena that are untainted by superstition. |
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The weather signs given by animals are strictly coincidental. {cf., 98}. For [the appearance of] animals cannot compel winter to end, nor does some divine being watch for these bests to venture forth and then bring to pass what they have foretold. For such foolishness would not occur to any creature, however humble, even if it had the least bit of intelligence – far less to a being possessing complete happiness. |
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Remember all these things, Pythocles. You will stay
far from superstition and you will also understand other phenomena similar
to those treated here. Above all, devote yourself to the study of
the atoms and the void, and all that relates to them, and to the criteria
of judgment, and also: why we we study these things. For if
these general topics are thoroughly mastered, they will make it easy to
discover the causes of specific phenomena. But those who do not have
the firmest possible grasp of these principles will not be able to study
the phenomena to any advantage, nor can they even understand why the study
is necessary. |
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Such are his views on phenomena of the sky.
|
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Regarding the rules of life how we should go about choosing some things while avoiding others, he writes about this [in his letter to Menoeceus]. Before quoting his words, however, let us review the opinions of Epicurus and his school concerning the wise man, {a.k.a., the Sage}. {The points which follow have been reordered in places
to preserve continuity of themes}. |
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|
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The school also holds that:
|
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And two sorts of happiness can be conceived:
|
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Let us now proceed to his letter: |
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Letter to
Menoeceus Epicurus to Menoeceus, Greetings, |
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|
Let no one delay the study of philosophy while young, and let no one tire of it as one grows old. For it is never too soon nor too late to devote oneself to the well-being of the soul. Whoever says that the time for philosophy has not yet come or that it has already passed is saying that it is too soon or too late for happiness. Therefore both the young and the old should study philosophy so that, while old, one may still be young with all the joy he has known from the past; and while young, one may at the same time be old through fearlessness of the future. We must practice what produces happiness, because when we have it, we have everything, and if we lack it, all our actions are aimed towards securing it. So I encourage you, as always, to study and practice my teachings, for they are the basic ingredients of a happy life. |
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A god is an immortal and happy being. This is well-known, but do not believe anything about divine nature other than what is congenial with an eternally happy existence. The gods do exist because we have preconceived notions of them, but they are not how like most people imagine them to be. Most people embellish their notions of the gods with false opinions. They credit the gods for delivering rewards and punishments because they commend those who share their own ways and condemn those who do not. Rejecting their mythology is not impious; what is impious is succumbing to it. |
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Death is no concern to us. All things good
and bad are experienced through sensation, but sensation ceases at
death. So death is nothing to us, and to know this makes a mortal
life happy. Life is not improved by adding infinite time; removing
the desire for immortality is what’s
required. There is no reason why one who is convinced that there is
nothing to fear upon death should fear anything about it during
life. And whoever says that he dreads death not because it’s painful to
experience only because it’s painful to
contemplate, is foolish. It is pointless to agonize over something
that brings no trouble when it arrives. So death, the most dreaded
of evils, is nothing to us, because when we exist, death is not present,
and when death is present, we do not exist. It
neither concerns the living nor the dead, since death does not exist for
the living, and the dead no longer exist. |
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|
Most people, however, either dread death as the greatest of suffering or long for it as a relief from suffering. One who is wise neither renounces life nor fears not living. Life does not offend him, nor does he suppose that not living is any kind of suffering. For just as he would not choose the greatest amount of food over what is most delicious, so too he does not seek the longest possible life, but rather the happiest. And he who advises the young man to live well and the old man to die well is also foolish – not only because it’s desirable to live, but because the art of living well and the art of dying well are the same. And he was still more wrong who said it would be better to have never been born, but that “Once born, be quick to pass through the gates of Hades” {Theognis, 425 - 427} If he was being serious, why was he not quick to end his life? Certainly the means were available if this was what he really wanted to do. But if he was not serious, then we have even less reason to believe him. Future days are neither wholly ours, nor wholly not ours. We must neither depend on them as sure to come nor despair that we won’t live to see them. |
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|
Among desires, some are natural and some are
vain. Of those that are natural, some are necessary and some
unnecessary. And of those that are necessary, some are necessary for
happiness, some for health, and some for life itself. A perfect
recognition of desires enables one to deliberate every choice and
avoidance with regard to whether it secures or upsets bodily comfort and
peace of mind – the goal of a happy life. |
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Everything we do is for the sake of freedom from pain
and anxiety. Once this is achieved, the storms in the soul
are stilled. Nothing else and nothing more are needed to perfect the
well-being of the body and soul. It is when we feel pain that we
must seek relief, which is pleasure. And when we no longer
feel pain, we have all the pleasure we need. |
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Pleasure, we declare, is the beginning and end of the
happy life. By nature, we recognize pleasure as the greatest
good. Every choice and avoidance we make is guided by pleasure as
our standard for judging the goodness of everything. |
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|
Although pleasure is the greatest good, not every
pleasure is worth choosing. We may instead avoid certain
pleasures when, by doing so, we avoid greater pains. We may also
choose to accept pain if, by doing so, it results in greater
pleasure. So while every pleasure is naturally good, not every
pleasure should be chosen. Likewise, every pain is naturally evil,
but not every pain is to be avoided. Only by surmising the benefits
and hazards can we decide. Thus, sometimes we must regard the good
as evil, and conversely: the evil as good. |
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We regard self-sufficiency as a great virtue – not
so we may only enjoy a few things, but so that we may be satisfied with a
few things if those are all we have. We are firmly convinced that
those who desire luxury the least, enjoy it the most, and that natural
desires are easily fulfilled, but vain desires are limitless. Plain
meals offer the same pleasure as luxurious fare, so long as the pain of
hunger is removed. Bread and water offer the greatest pleasure for
those in need of them. Accustoming oneself to a simple lifestyle is
healthy and it doesn’t sap our
motivation to perform the necessary tasks of life. Doing without
luxuries for long intervals allows us to better appreciate them and keeps
us fearless against changes of fortune. |
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When we say that pleasure is the goal, we do not mean the pleasure of debauchery or sensuality. Despite whatever may be said by those who misunderstand, disagree with, or deliberately slander our teachings, the goal we do seek is this: freedom from pain in the body and freedom from turmoil in the soul. For it is not continuous drinking and revelry, the sexual enjoyment of women and boys, or feasting upon fish and fancy cuisine which result in a happy life. Sober reasoning is what is needed, which mediates every choice and avoidance and liberates us from the false beliefs which are the greatest source of anxiety. |
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The greatest virtue and the basis for all virtues is
prudence. Prudence,
the art of practical wisdom, is something even more valuable than
philosophy, because all other virtues spring from it. It teaches us
that it is not possible to live pleasurably unless one also lives
prudently, honorably, and justly; nor is it possible to live prudently,
honestly, and justly without living pleasurably. For the virtues are
inseparable from a happy life, and living happily is inseparable from the
virtues. |
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Who could conceivably be better off than one who is
wise? No one could be more content than one who simply reveres
the gods, who is utterly unafraid of death, and who has discovered the
natural goal of life. He understands that pleasure, the greatest
good, is easily supplied to absolute fullness, while pain, the greatest
evil, lasts only a moment when intense and is easily tolerated when
prolonged. |
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Some believe that everything is ruled by fate,
but we should dismiss this. One who is wise knows that the
greater power of decision lies within oneself. He understands that
while some things are indeed caused by fate, other things happen by chance
or by choice. He sees that fate is irreproachable and chance
unreliable, but that matters of choice deserve either praise or blame
because they are not subject to any external power. One would be
better off believing in the myths about the gods than to be enslaved by
the determinism proclaimed by certain physicists. At least the myths
offer hope of winning divine favors through prayer, but fate can never be
appealed. |
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Some believe that chance is a god, but we should dismiss this also. One who is wise knows the gods do not act randomly. Nor does he believe that everything is randomly caused. He does not believe that chance doles out good and evil to make human lives happy or unhappy, only that it creates these possibilities. He would actually prefer to suffer setbacks while acting wisely than to have miraculous luck while acting foolishly; for it would be better that well-planned actions should perchance fail than ill-planned actions should perchance succeed. |
{15} | |||||||||
Practice these teachings daily and nightly. Study them on your own or in the company of a like-minded friend, and you shall not be disturbed while awake or asleep. You shall live like a god among men, because one whose life is fortified by immortal blessings in no way resembles a mortal being. |
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Such are his views on the conduct of life, which is something he elaborates upon in other works. | |||||||||||
Regarding pleasure, he differs from the Cyrenaics, who do
not recognize katastematic {passive} pleasures, but only
kinetic {active} pleasures. But he recognizes both types, for
the mind and body, as he states in his work On Choices and
Avoidances, in his treatment On the End-Goal, in the first book
On Lifecourses and in his Letter to the Philosophers of
Mytilene. |
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Diogenes also does so in Book XVII of his
Selections, and Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual
words are: “But when
pleasure is understood, I mean both the kind which is in motion and that
which is a state of rest.” And Epicurus in his book On Choices
remarks, “Indeed, freedom from anxiety and the absence of pain are
katastematic pleasures, while joy and delight are regarded as
pleasures in motion and in action.” |
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He further disagrees with the Cyrenaics in that they consider the pains of the body to be worse than troubles in the mind by arguing that those who do wrong, are bodily punished. Nonetheless, he considers the troubles of the mind the worst, because the body only feels a present affliction, but the mind feels the past, the present, and the future. Conversely, he contends also that the pleasures of the mind are greater than those of the body. He cites as proof that pleasure is the chief good the fact that all animals from the moment of their birth are delighted with pleasure and distressed by pain by their natural instincts, without need of reason. Therefore also, we, with our own inclinations, flee from pain; so that Hercules, when devoured by his poisoned tunic cries out: Shouting and groaning,
and the rocks around |
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And we choose the virtues too on account of pleasure and not for their own sake, just as we take medicine for the sake of health. Diogenes also says this Book XX of his Selections, and he also calls education recreation. Epicurus describes virtue as inseparable from pleasure, while everything separable from pleasure is expendable. |
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But now let us add the finishing stroke, so to speak, to this whole work and to the life of this philosopher, with his Principal Doctrines – taking for our end that which is the beginning of happiness. Proceed to: Principal Doctrines
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Scholiast Commentary Letter to Herodotus 1) 039: He also says this near the beginning of the Big Summary and in Book I of On Nature. 2) 040: He repeats this in Books I, XIV, and XV of On Nature and in the Big Summary. 3) 043: For neither does the divisibility go on ad infinitum, he says below; but he adds, since the qualities change, unless one is prepared to also simply enlarge their sizes ad infinitum... {text breaks off}. 4) 043: He also says further down that the atoms move with equal speed, since the void makes way for the lightest and heaviest alike. 5) 044: He says further down that atoms have no quality at all except shape, size and weight. In his twelve-book Doctrine of the Elements he says that color, however, varies with the arrangement of the atoms, and that they are not of any and every size; at any rate no atom [is big enough to have] ever been seen by our senses. 6) 050: Following a certain motion in ourselves which is linked with, but distinct from, the mental picture presented – this is how falsehood occurs. 7) 066: Elsewhere he says that:
8) 073a: He also says this in Book II of On Nature and in the Big Summary. 9) 073b: It is clear, then, that he says that the world-systems are destructible, since their parts are subject to change. Elsewhere he says that the earth is supported by the air. 10) 074: But in Book 12 of On Nature he himself says that they are different: some are spherical, some oval, and others have shapes even different from these; but they do not have every possible shape. Nor are they living beings separated off from the infinite. 11) 074: And the same holds good for their nourishment in a world after they have arisen. One must believe that it happens in the same way on earth too.
12) 091: This he states in Book XI of On Nature. For, he says, if its apparent size is reduced by its distance, its brightness would be even more reduced; but there is no distance more suitable for causing such a reduction {perhaps implying that the sun would otherwise be very dark}. 13) 091: after “They may actually be a little larger, a little smaller, or exactly the same size as at what we see...” the comment is: “...but not at the same time.” 14) 096: He says the same in Book XII of On Nature, and additionally that the sun is eclipsed when the moon darkens it, and the moon is either eclipsed by the shadow of the earth or due to the moon’s withdrawal. This is also cited by Diogenes the Epicurean in Book I of his Selections.
15) 135: Elsewhere he rejects divination entirely, e.g., in the Small Summary, and says “No means of predicting the future really exists, and even if it did, we must regard what happens according to it as nothing to us.” |